(PSM1) Opportunity Structures and their Consequences for Movements

All social movement groups, organizations, and individual participants operate within structures of opportunities and constraints. Opportunities and constraints may relate to available financial resources, technologies, civic and legal space, and social support, among other factors. The degree to which these types of opportunities and/or constraints are present or absent and what form they take, significantly shape social movement participation, identity-building, organizational forms, and tactics. This panel will offer a set of diverse international and Canadian case studies that examine how resources, technologies, civic and legal space, and social support provide opportunities and constraints that structure social movements. Tags: Politics, Social Movements

Organizers: Zitian Sun, McGill University, Rebecca Haines, McGill University, Yi-Cheng Hsieh, McGill University, Alessandro Drago, McGill University, Taisto Witt, McGill University; Chair: Zitian Sun, McGill University; Discussants: Rebecca Haines, McGill University, Yi-Cheng Hsieh, McGill University

Presentations

Charlotte Gaudreau, McGill University

Institutionalization or Autonomy?: Isomorphism Among Social Movement Organizations in Post-2019 Lebanon

The dynamics of mass uprisings, their causes, and their consequences have captivated the social and political imagination, serving as a focal point for academic inquiry. Yet, the examination of movements tends to be concentrated on moments of heightened activity, with less attention paid to periods characterized by a dearth of mobilizations—a phase designated by Taylor as ‘abeyance’. Studying movement demise is essential to understanding that decline does not mean dissolution but instead can illustrate the transformation of social movement organization’s (SMO) strategies from one period to another. Drawing on the case of Lebanon, this research responds Roose’s (2017) call to integrate social movement studies with Neo-institutionalism by exploring why the majority of SMOs that emerged after the 2019 uprising transitioned into NGO-ization. In essence, the research aims to understand why, despite a multitude of organizational possibilities, the majority of activist organizations tend to adhere to a common script, irrespective of its impact on social movements’ outcomes. Between 2011 and 2019, Lebanon witnessed a surge in anti-sectarian social movements, marked by an expansion in territorial scope, social basis, and repertoire of actions. These culminated in October 2019 with an unprecedented state-wide upheaval. Notwithstanding their relative failure, these events constitute an incremental and mounting challenge against Lebanon’s establishment. However, the post-2019 landscape has been characterized by a confluence of crises: financial collapse, pervasive corruption, natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut port explosion, sectarian conflicts, and regional warfare. Despite the social impact of the 2019 revolutionary moment, a notable outcome has been the re-legitimization of the sectarian system, and with it, a growth in state power resulting in many setbacks for the civil society. Mass demobilization, significant emigration, and shrinking civic space have profoundly influenced activist networks and organizations. My research thus investigates the decision-making processes informing strategic choices post-mobilization demise, employing ongoing fieldwork and in-depth interviews with key actors in the Lebanese civil society. My findings indicate that in post-2019 Lebanon, the scarcity of resources compels new SMOs to seek financial support from international entities, reshaping the organizational landscape. However, this reliance on foreign funding necessitates building legitimacy and institutional recognition. In this context, activists face choices such as remaining informal, forming a cooperative, a not-for-profit enterprise, or becoming a registered association. The last option, although the most restrictive, subjects organizations to government scrutiny—a path followed by the vast majority of groups interviewed. In essence, this heightened dependence on international funding compromises organizational autonomy and hinders the capacity for impactful actions. Institutionalization commonly influences the activities undertaken by SMOs, prompting a shift towards more conventional or moderate forms of activism. The question then arises: why do activist groups opt for such a path? Through my fieldwork, I discovered that the crux of the matter lies not in the actors’ lack of rationality. Lebanese activists are highly conscious of the trade-offs associated with NGO-ization. This subject sparks animated debates, and the majority of organizations actively work to devise internal mechanisms for preserving their autonomy. While legal regulations contribute to understanding part of the issue, the isomorphism of SMOs is better explained through the internalization of cultural cognitive rules. Aligning with theories from the neo-institutionalist sociology of organizations, my interviews demonstrate that the professionalization of activism and the tendency towards imitation are crucial factors in explaining the relatively homogenous choices of organizational structures and strategies in Lebanon.  

Yasmin Koop-Monteiro, University of British Columbia

A tale of two climate change meetings: Repertoires of protest across COP26 and COP28-related Instagram posts

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the repertoires of protest that were spotlighted and promoted within Instagram during the United Nations 2021 and 2023 Climate Change Conferences (COP26 and COP28) held in Glasgow, Scotland and Expo City Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), respectively. The annual COP meetings represent “regularly scheduled critical events” that social movements can anticipate and mobilize around in their attempts to influence international climate change discourse and political deliberations (Stoddart et al. 2023). However, as COP meetings change locations annually and move across the world, they do not always offer the same political opportunities for social movement intervention. The substantially different social and political contexts of these two host sites — Glasgow and Dubai – provide an excellent opportunity for analysing the intersection of the climate movement’s repertoires of protest and the different political opportunity structures of different COP host sites. Exploring the most common forms of activism – and their links to climate discourse and imagery – that are spotlighted within COP-related Instagram posts, we reflect on (1) the unique political contexts of both climate change meetings, as well as (2) the potential influence that these unique contexts may have had on the repertoires of protest, discourse and imagery used through social media during COP26 and COP28. Theoretically, this paper draws on the social movements literature, particularly Political Process Theory which emphasizes three major factors as critical to social movement mobilization: (1) “organizational ‘readiness’” or the degree of organization in an aggrieved community, (2) “cognitive liberation” or the “collective assessment of…prospects for successful insurgency weighed against the risks involved in each action,” and (3) “political opportunities” or circumstances which make mobilization possible and more fruitful (McAdam 1982:34, 2013; Sun and Huang 2017). Here, special attention is given to “cognitive liberation” and “political opportunities” and their potential role in shaping the patterns of climate communication regarding COP26 and COP28 within Instagram. Data for this study were collected in two separate occasions in 2021 and 2023 during pre-COP, COP, and post-COP periods (on October 27–November 16, 2021 for COP26 and November 26–December 16, 2023 for COP28). For our analysis, we conducted a (1) qualitative visual and textual analysis, and (2) discourse network analysis of Instagram posts. We examined various types of (i) actors (e.g. NGOs/social movement organizations, government organizations, business organizations, media organizations), (ii) discourses (e.g. “climate crisis”), (iii) images (e.g. protest imagery), and (iv) repertoires of protest (e.g. “art-ivism”) being featured in each post. Our preliminary results show important differences between our COP26 and COP28 samples. For example, we find relatively fewer Instagram posts featuring protest imagery during COP28 in Dubai, UAE than during COP26 in Glasgow, Scotland. In addition, we see relatively fewer Instagram posts promoting collective actions (e.g. marches, civil disobedience) or individual actions (e.g. going vegan, zero-waste lifestyles) to address climate change during COP28 than during COP26. Given the differing political contexts of each COP meeting’s host country — particularly the democratic versus authoritarian state status of Scotland versus UAE, and the significant restrictions on protest and free speech that exist in the UAE — these results are not surprising. Overall, these findings reveal how the selection of COP venues can be a key influence on the type of engagement from civil society — with more democratic host countries enabling the promotion and participation in a greater diversity of individual or collective actions, while non-democratic host countries can have a chilling effect on in social movement participation. We conclude by considering the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for understanding the interplay between social movement mobilization and the political opportunities offered by regularly scheduled critical events such as COP climate change meetings.

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Non-presenting authors: Mark Shakespear, University of British Columbia; Mark C.J. Stoddart, Memorial University; David B. Tindall, University of British Columbia; Andrew K. Jorgenson, University of British Columbia

Kayla Preston, University of Toronto

"It's like we're trying to find a home." Canadian Right-Wing Youths Differing Pathways to Activism

The right-wing cannot be represented as a monolith in Canada society. In fact, many right-wing Canadian groups and organizations have vastly different opinions, thoughts and hold differing political issues as key to their organization’s platform. This fact also holds true to right-wing youth social movement organizers in Canada. In this paper, I analyze 40 interviews as well as over 200 hours of ethnographic fieldwork with right-wing youth organizations and with individual members affiliated with these groups. During these interactions I found that my interlocutors could be grouped into two major categories, what I call the ideologue or the careerist. The individuals in these groups differ in three major ways. First, the extremeness of their views. While ideologues espouse quite extreme views (anti-immigration, anti-trans and queer rights, anti-COVID mandates and anti-woke), careerists are more moderate in their ideas both in interviews and in group settings (pro-same sex marriage, believing in multiculturalism, supportive of COVID vaccinations). Second, these groups differ in their affiliation with political parties. While careerists have been employed by a political party and are stringent in their party affiliation, ideologues tend to support whoever they believe will implement the strictest policies but are very critical of the political establishment. Third, ideologues and careerists typically have differing relationships to family and/or childhood trauma. While careerists have strong bonds with family members, ideologues typically have a history of childhood/teenage trauma related to family separation, in-fighting within families, bullying, feelings of isolation, death of close family members, or abandonment. However, while these groups of individuals differ in many aspects related to their activism, they are often a part of the same group or organization. Theoretically, I pinpoint the reasons of these divisions between pathways toward activism as a political and emotional reaction to personal turbulent times, and the shifts in political ideology as a reaction to trauma in the life course. I use the literature on activism as a reaction to social disenfranchisement to identify how turbulent life events push youths toward activism (Munson, 2008). This literature suggests that some individuals turn to activism as a response to trauma in the life course. Furthermore, this paper takes serious allegations that activism is simply biographically-drive, individualistic behaviour but is rather a collective response to a social phenomenon. Hochschilds (2016) study of Tea Party voters in the deep south United States and Gests (2016) study of white working-class individuals in formally industrial cities highlight how the economic recession and the loss of social status propel individuals to become political, either on the right or on the left. My paper suggests that youths who turn toward the political right because of life trauma may be more adamant in their political views and be more extreme because, in their activism, they have found a political and ideological home that they must maintain. This also makes this sector of youth more invested in their social movement. Meanwhile careerists are politically active and interested in political issues however their identities are less invested in right-wing issues or values and therefore they do not hold such extreme ideas.