(THE3) Sociological Metatheory & The Philosophy of Social Science

This session invites papers focusing on sociological metatheory and the philosophy of social science, broadly understood. This area generally concerns debates about the fundamental assumptions in sociology covering a wide range of areas, including: epistemology and methodology; ontology and the nature of social reality; axiology and normative commitments, and aesthetics (e.g., the forms sociology takes; different ways it is conveyed, etc.), to name a few. The field has been recently re-energized by Critical Realism, contemporary nominalism, decolonizing scholars, new materialism, among more conventional discussions of materialism, idealism, positivism, vitalism, constructivism, and nominalism, among others. Tags: Knowledge, Theory

Organizer: Reiss Kruger, York University; Chair: Reiss Kruger, York University; Discussant: Mario Marotta, Université du Québec à Montréal

Presentations

Harley D. Dickinson, University of Saskatchewan

Reflexive Moderniza/on as the Two-sided Ra/onaliza/on of Modern Socie/es and Cultures

Are Western socie/es and cultures modern or post-modern? In 1959, C. Wright Mills announced that the most advanced Western socie/es had entered a new post-modern epoch. As a result, he called for a new post-modern sociology - one that rejected Grand theory and what he termed the abstracted empiricism of statistical techniques. Many rushed to assume the post-modernist mantle of Mills the Prophet (Friedrichs, 1970). Others rejected Mills’ epochal proclamation. Habermas (1984; 1985), for example, argued that post-modernism was an anti-modern ideology, and that Western moderniza/on remained an incomplete but on-going socio-cultural project. Others also agreed that Western societies and cultures remained modern, but had entered a neo-modern phase (Tiryakian, 1991). Although many sociological theorists agreed with this proposition, there is no agreement on how to define neo-modernism, or what to call it. In this paper I propose a synthesis of the theories of Habermas argument that moderniza/on is a two-sided rationalization process and Beck’s theory of Reflexive, or Second, Modernization as the modernization of already (partially?) modernized systems institutions. Specifically, using Habermas’ three-dimensional concept of rationality I argue that Reflexive Sociology is reflecting about foundational ontological, epistemological, axiological, and praxiological assump/ons that shape both the discipline and modernizing societies and cultures in general

Talita Yaltırık, York University

Marx, Labour and the Question of "Social Ontology"

The question of whether Marx has a social ontology is a controversial question in the history of Marxism. In this presentation, I trace the ontological implications of Marx’s positioning of labour in the sense of human activity by questioning the possibilities of a “social ontology” which is based on Marx through the interpretations of Marx by Lukács (1978) in his later writing Ontology of Social Being , Mészáros (1975), Arthur (1986) and Gould (1978). In this examination, by considering the different appearances of labor in Marx’s writings, I recognize the important distinction which is noted by Mészáros between labour as "productive activity" which has an ontological attribution and as the “capitalistically structured activity” which is the base of all alienation (Mészáros, 1975, p. 78). By considering this distinction which I refer to as the distinction between labour as human activity and labour as alienated labour in this presentation, I examine the aforementioned theoreticians’ approaches to Marx’s writings on an ontological ground through the centrality of the concept of labour. In this examination, I also consider the commonalities and divergences between their conceptualizations of labour and their approaches to the question of ontology. According to Lukács, through Marx’s understanding, the way is opened for describing social existence ontologically on a material basis (Lukács, 1978). According to Lukács’ interpretation of Marx in the Ontology of Social Being , "man" and all of his relationships have both “insuperable natural basis and the permanent social transformation of this” (Lukács, 1978, p. 6). Lukács claims the centrality of the category of labour, which is at the base of this double transformation, in Marx’s works (Lukács, 1978, p. 6). In this way, Marx’s approach goes beyond the exclusive opposition between social being and natural being which is asserted by many bourgeois philosophers (Lukács, 1978, p. 7). By pointing out the possibilities of the concept of "human productive activity", Mészáros also argues that both the “‘anthropological principle’” and “relativistic ‘historicism’” can only be transcended through “a synthesis of history and anthropology”, and it is possible with a “comprehensive, materialist, dialectical ontology ” which has the central reference to “‘self-developing human labour’” (Mészáros, 1975, p. 48). According to Arthur, Marx approaches objectification, in other words, the mediation of "productive activity", which is at the center of the social and historical development of "mankind", ontologically because it is the element that links the human and the natural, the ideal and the material, teleology and causality to each other (Arthur, 1986). Arthur argues that this aspect of Marx’s approach separates him from idealist social ontologies and biological reductionists (Arthur, 1986). According to Gould, Marx approaches labour as an activity of self-creation which is through interaction with nature and other individuals, rather than in immediacy, and he describes it as objectification (Gould, 1978). Gould explicitly describes Marx’s "concrete social theory" as social ontology, and she shows Marx’s interest in social reality as the difference between Marx and most of the traditional ontologists, while she claims that he meets with them in their common interest in the nature of reality (Gould, 1978). According to Gould, Marx’s point of radical departure is his interpretation of the ontological categories in a concrete way as having social and historical meaning (Gould, 1978). Despite the singularity of their approaches, all of these theoreticians point out the uniqueness of Marx’s ontology by emphasizing how it goes beyond the dichotomy of natural and social through his positioning of the concept of labour which has ontological attribution. In this light, in this presentation, by examining Marx’s writings through these theoreticians’ approaches, I aim to present the possibilities of the unique contribution of Marx to thinking of a social ontology which goes beyond the dichotomous ways of approaching social reality.

Francis Léveillé, Concordia University

"Hearkening" for a Material Hermeneutics

This paper seeks to bridge the recent gap between materiality and subjectivity in social theory. The material world is increasingly becoming a central topic in social theory. Emerging from this movement, new materialism turns our attention to a physical, tangible world that exists outside of our interpretations and representations of it. Although a generalized environmental crisis is acknowledged by most, there is a visible unease to engage with theories emerging from the material turn. Many academics trained in social constructionist traditions are voicing a certain form of pessimism towards new materialism. I argue that social constructionist theories and theories of materiality have evolved within their respective silos and very few attempts have been made to bridge the gaps between the two. However, recently, philosophers of technology such as Don Ihde have argued for a form of hermeneutics that extends to technical objects. Motivated by the challenge posed by the material turn and its appointment of agency to materiality, this paper pushes forward the idea of a material hermeneutics through Paul Ricoeur’s concept of hearkening . The hermeneutic subject is always constituted by otherness, through its encounters with its human others. A new encounter signifies a new questioning and a new understanding of the self. The only way to conceptualize a subject confronted with non-human otherness is then a subject that is further weakened. This paper thus seeks out the hermeneutic subject in its most weakened form. Such a weakened subject is theorized in Ricoeur’s 1974 essay Religion, Atheism, and Faith. In this very personal essay, Ricoeur juggles his Christianity with the atheist discourse of the modern world he inhabits. If God and religion are truly dead, can faith be salvaged in some way? The analysis that follows this question leads him to introduce hearkening as a form of being. Once religious structures of prohibition have been removed by atheism, a new opportunity to theorize the position of the subject within the world is opened. Ricoeur argues that at this bare level, before ethics, the subject must willingly open itself to the world. This leads to a mode of nonethical understanding which comes out of the initial act of listening devoid of any moral duties. This initial act of listening – hearkening – implies no relation to a pre-existing order since listening always comes before obedience. The subject does not have control of what comes to it in this first act, the first word holds agency over the subject. At this point Ricoeur offers us a subject which is opened to be acted upon by unknown agencies. This is where an agency of materiality can be considered to find a connection between hermeneutics and new materialism. A long detour has provided us with a weakened subject which puts its faith in active listening. This listening corresponds to a conative effort to exist and opens up the power of word to mold the subject. In the face of the unknown, of an epistemological limit, the weakened subject accepts to listen without striving to explain. Ricoeur describes the word that comes unto the subject as a vital reality . This term connects us to the work of new materialist authors such as Karen Barad and Jane Bennett. Although Ricoeur does not suggest that words express a conative effort independently of the will of the one who utters them, we can nonetheless understand the hermeneutics he presents as being more than an inter-subjective philosophy. Considering that for Ricoeur word is afforded an agency, the hermeneutic subject confronted with materiality, understood as a conative body, can willingly accept to be modified by nature – the agency of materiality – only insofar as it has a voice. The hermeneutic subject always understands itself as belonging to the cultural world and the mode of listening I present in this paper can extend this sense of belonging to the natural world. A true connection between hermeneutic subjectivity and the materiality presented in new materialism is probably impossible, but this paper shows that Ricoeur’s understanding of subjects driven by modesty and reflexivity is more than fit for a world where a deep understanding of the other and of the world is needed to live through rampant social and ecological crises.