Bridging the gap between "is" and "ought" The question of what "should" be and Sociology.


Fabio Robibaro, University of Toronto

Emile Durkheim concludes his, The Rules of the Sociological Method, by positing the difference between philosophy and sociology. He claims that sociology is independent from philosophy and while it comes from these doctrines, it needs not to be over encumbered by them. Sociology should focus on empirical observation and the analysis of “social facts.” This perspective, while foundational for sociology, limits the discipline by avoiding normative or prescriptive inquiries, particularly those pertaining to social change and justice. This limitation restricts sociologys ability to address and propose solutions to social issues by remaining solely in the domain of “is” and not being able to prescribe an “ought”. Through highlighting the continuous debate in sociology about its canonical thinkers and the nature of the discipline itself we can see that there are inconsistent perspectives across foundational figures in the discipline. Both Karl Marx and Durkheim appear consistently in what is widely considered the “canon” of classical sociology and this paper does not argue against this; rather, their approaches to sociology are critically examined. The discussion then shifts to the philosophical roots of sociology, particularly focusing on David Humes “is-ought” problem and G.E. Moores concept of the “naturalistic fallacy.” These philosophical concepts are used to explore the limitations of deriving normative conclusions from empirical observations. The paper further examines John Searles and Max Blacks arguments that challenge the strict separation between descriptive (is) and prescriptive (ought) statements in moral and social discourse. Searle’s concept of institutional facts and Black’s linguistic analysis suggest that normative statements can logically arise from factual descriptions in certain social contexts. This perspective bridges the gap between descriptive and prescriptive aspects in philosophy and in so challenges Durkheims emphasis on a purely descriptive approach. Further, this paper explores Marxs work to demonstrate how sociological analysis, while grounded in empirical observation, can also advocate for social change. Marxs blend of empirical analysis and normative advocacy is presented as a model for a more comprehensive sociological approach. This is contrasted with Durkheims more descriptive and objective methodology, highlighting the limitations of excluding normative considerations. Drawing from both ideal and non-ideal theory, I posit a potential place for “shoulds” in sociology. This argument takes from political theory, more specifically John Rawls distinction between ideal theory, which formulates principles in a hypothetical, perfectly just society, and non-ideal theory, which deals with real-world applications of these principles, and argues for a sociology that bridges empirical reality (is) with normative ideals (ought). This approach is exemplified through Erik Olin Wrights “real utopias” project, which integrates empirical analysis with visions of equitable societal structures. I argue that sociology should not confine itself to a purely descriptive or objective methodology as proposed by Durkheim. Instead, it should integrate the normative and the descriptive, allowing for a sociological practice that is both empirically grounded and oriented towards social change. A balance between empirical observation and normative advocacy can provide a more robust and impactful sociological inquiry, one that is capable of not only interpreting but also transforming the social world. This approach acknowledges the importance of sociological theory in shaping methodologies and argues for a sociology that embraces both its scientific and philosophical roots. This paper ultimately calls for a reevaluation of sociologys foundations, advocating for a discipline that actively engages with the ideals of justice, fairness, and equality, informed by empirical reality.

This paper will be presented at the following session: