(THE5b) Classical Social Theory II

This session aims to provide a space for the engagement with a wide range of 'classical' social theory, including not only the typical classics such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, but a wider range of interdisciplinary influences in what has developed over time into contemporary sociology, ranging from Plato and Aristotle, to Ibn Sina and Ibn Khaldun, to Smith and Kant, to Saint-Simon and Comte, to Hegel and Nietzsche, to Wollstonecraft, Cooley, Simmel, DuBois, and beyond! This session seeks to critically revive engagement with sociology's interdisciplinary past, both challenging narrow assumptions many have in their readings of the classics and allowing for the redeployment of 'living theory,' from the past to the present, and into the future. Tags: Knowledge, Theory

Organizer: Reiss Kruger, York University; Chair: Reiss Kruger, York University; Discussant: Jesse Carlson, Acadia University

Presentations

Evan Wicklund, Carleton University

The Ethics of Vulnerability, Alterity, and Nonconformist Embodiment: Situating Poststructuralism as a Moral Theory

While the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has had deleterious medical, social, and economic consequences in societies throughout the world, it has disproportionally impacted persons with compromised health conditions and persons labeled as having disabilities (Singh, 2020). As Tom Shakespeare and his colleagues (2021) claim, the coronavirus has disproportionally affected these populations not only because they are at an “increased risk of poor outcomes from the disease itself”, but also because they often have difficulties accessing inclusive healthcare and experience increased levels of social isolation (p. 1331). Although the data on disability and the coronavirus is concerning, the pandemic has also provided opportunities to contemplate the value of critical theory, explore why care ethics are important, and pose critical questions about which bodies are valued in society and which are not. In this presentation, I examine how an ethics of care that prioritizes alterity (Levinas, 2009) and vulnerability (Kittay, 2018) is crucial for enhancing the lived experiences of persons with nonconforming embodiments. To broaden my understanding of the sociocultural and philosophical ethics of disablement, I use a genealogical analysis (Foucault, 1990; Nietzsche, 2003), to explain how while ethics has been understood in various ways, it has consistently maintained the standard of compulsory ablebodiedness, or the higher valuation of normatively conforming bodyminds over others (McRuer, 2006; Reynolds, 2022). To that end, I investigate the foundations of ethics in Western societies to formulate a hypothesis of how embodied difference provides nascent opportunities for theorizing about the ethics of care. I have divided my presentation into two sections: I first provide a brief overview of the historical approaches to ethical discourse, focusing on virtue, deontological, and consequentialist ethics. I then explain how phenomenologists have built upon the teleology of their predecessors, but are not only interested in what it means to live in a way that is congruent with universalist morality, but more specifically what it means to live an ethical life with others. In the second overarching section, I first explore what may be referred to as the feminist turn in ethics (Gilligan, 1989; Kittay, 2012; Wendell, 1997); a discourse which draws upon traditional forms of moral theory, yet fosters principles such as relationality and impartiality, both of which are important for conceptualizing an ethics of care. Finally, I argue that how while traditional approaches to moral theory may be useful for theorizing the intersections of nonconformist embodiment, the writings of Emmanuel Levinas (2009) provide a unique opportunity to theorize about an ethics of care that is grounded in the asymmetrical responsibility we have with others. In conclusion, I introduce two concepts which I believe prognosticate further areas of research and portend a poststructuralist ethics of care which are congruent with Levinasian care ethics. The first is Martin Heidegger’s (2010) explanation of the process of breaking-down, while the second is Georges Bataille’s (1985) advocation for a metaphysics of heterology, which relies upon a materialistic philosophy of expenditure and excess. I argue that tracing the genealogical development of these concepts helps me develop a framework that decentres the homogenization of contemporary discourses on ethics, and therefore invokes a theoretical approach to understanding the nuances of the obligation we have to other sentient beings in our proximity.

Talita Yaltırık, York University

Labour in Marx's Writings: A Feminist Reconsideration through Space, Time and Body

In this presentation, Marx’s understanding of labour is re-examined in light of feminist critiques of it through feminist interpretations of Marx’s critique of political economy and his view of social reality. This examination is based on a feminist reconsideration of Marx through space, time and body. In the first part of the presentation, Marx’s understanding of labour as human activity and his interrelational view of natural and historical are examined. His distinction between objectification and alienation is presented in light of his critical relation with Hegel. The transformation of his understanding of “alienation of labour” is traced from his “early” to “mature” writings by going beyond the dichotomous interpretations of Marx’s writings in the twentieth century. In this way, his critique of political economy through his understanding of value, his relational view of social reality that is inseparable from his critique and his relational view of production and reproduction are examined. The possibilities of an interpretation of Marx through space, time and body are traced. In the second part, feminist critiques and reconsiderations of Marx’s interrelational view of natural and historical through his understanding of human activity and of “alienation of labour” are presented. Feminist critiques and reconsiderations of Marx’s critique of political economy and his understanding of social reality, besides his understanding of reproduction with his relational view of production and reproduction, are demonstrated. The possibilities of an interpretation of Marx through space, time and body are critically reconsidered from a feminist perspective. In this way, this presentation firstly aims to show the importance of the particular interpretation of Marx’s understanding of labour, which is presented in the first section, by going beyond the dichotomous interpretations of his writings in the 20th century. It is argued that this interpretation is crucial to explore the possibilities of Marx’s understanding of labour from the feminist perspective which is proposed in this presentation. Secondly, based on this interpretation of Marx, the presentation aims to examine the possibilities and limitations of Marx’s understanding of labour from a feminist perspective in light of feminist critiques and reconsiderations. The feminist critiques and reconsiderations which are included in the presentation are mainly based on the contributions of Social Reproduction Theory without neglecting the singularity of the approaches of the scholars whose works are categorized under the title of Social Reproduction Theory. However, feminist critiques and reconsiderations which are included in the presentation are not limited to Social Reproduction Theory. While the contributions of Social Reproduction Theory are recognized in this examination, the feminist approach to Marx, which is presented in this presentation, is also based on a critical reconsideration of Social Reproduction Theory. The aim of this presentation is not to focus on all feminist critiques and interpretations of Marx in the literature which would go beyond the boundaries of the presentation. The analysis in this presentation is limited to several feminist theoreticians’ critiques and reconsiderations of Marx’s understanding of labour in line with the aspects which are examined in the first section. Overall, this paper aims to contribute to both feminist reconsiderations of Marx in contemporary social and political theory and to the analysis of the contemporary appearances of labour, spatial-temporal experience and the body in patriarchal capitalism.

Fabio Robibaro, University of Toronto

Bridging the gap between "is" and "ought" The question of what "should" be and Sociology.

Emile Durkheim concludes his, The Rules of the Sociological Method, by positing the difference between philosophy and sociology. He claims that sociology is independent from philosophy and while it comes from these doctrines, it needs not to be over encumbered by them. Sociology should focus on empirical observation and the analysis of “social facts.” This perspective, while foundational for sociology, limits the discipline by avoiding normative or prescriptive inquiries, particularly those pertaining to social change and justice. This limitation restricts sociologys ability to address and propose solutions to social issues by remaining solely in the domain of “is” and not being able to prescribe an “ought”. Through highlighting the continuous debate in sociology about its canonical thinkers and the nature of the discipline itself we can see that there are inconsistent perspectives across foundational figures in the discipline. Both Karl Marx and Durkheim appear consistently in what is widely considered the “canon” of classical sociology and this paper does not argue against this; rather, their approaches to sociology are critically examined. The discussion then shifts to the philosophical roots of sociology, particularly focusing on David Humes “is-ought” problem and G.E. Moores concept of the “naturalistic fallacy.” These philosophical concepts are used to explore the limitations of deriving normative conclusions from empirical observations. The paper further examines John Searles and Max Blacks arguments that challenge the strict separation between descriptive (is) and prescriptive (ought) statements in moral and social discourse. Searle’s concept of institutional facts and Black’s linguistic analysis suggest that normative statements can logically arise from factual descriptions in certain social contexts. This perspective bridges the gap between descriptive and prescriptive aspects in philosophy and in so challenges Durkheims emphasis on a purely descriptive approach. Further, this paper explores Marxs work to demonstrate how sociological analysis, while grounded in empirical observation, can also advocate for social change. Marxs blend of empirical analysis and normative advocacy is presented as a model for a more comprehensive sociological approach. This is contrasted with Durkheims more descriptive and objective methodology, highlighting the limitations of excluding normative considerations. Drawing from both ideal and non-ideal theory, I posit a potential place for “shoulds” in sociology. This argument takes from political theory, more specifically John Rawls distinction between ideal theory, which formulates principles in a hypothetical, perfectly just society, and non-ideal theory, which deals with real-world applications of these principles, and argues for a sociology that bridges empirical reality (is) with normative ideals (ought). This approach is exemplified through Erik Olin Wrights “real utopias” project, which integrates empirical analysis with visions of equitable societal structures. I argue that sociology should not confine itself to a purely descriptive or objective methodology as proposed by Durkheim. Instead, it should integrate the normative and the descriptive, allowing for a sociological practice that is both empirically grounded and oriented towards social change. A balance between empirical observation and normative advocacy can provide a more robust and impactful sociological inquiry, one that is capable of not only interpreting but also transforming the social world. This approach acknowledges the importance of sociological theory in shaping methodologies and argues for a sociology that embraces both its scientific and philosophical roots. This paper ultimately calls for a reevaluation of sociologys foundations, advocating for a discipline that actively engages with the ideals of justice, fairness, and equality, informed by empirical reality.

Ladan Adhami-Dorrani, York University

The Ingrained Emotional Alienation in Amor Mundi

The brilliant and ever relevant Hannah Arendt, whose intellectual activities made her one of the most outspoken anti-authoritarian and anti-totalitarian figures of the 20th century, in The Human Condition speaks about world alienation. Arendt’s texts shed light onto the covert and overt violence of modernity proliferated by modern nation states that call for political participation in order to create a strong political bulwark against authoritarian and totalitarian ideas, movements and governments. Arendt’s love of the world, or what she calls amor mundi, is derived from her political and ethical conviction that plurality is the law of existence. Although Arendt invites the inhabitants of the world to the love of the world, she considers emotions not only as parts of the heart; but also, believes that, ‘there is no continuity or certainty in man’s ever-changing moods and the radical subjectivism of his emotional life.’ While appreciating Arendt’s significant contribution to the world and well beyond, there is an ingrained emotional alienation in Arendt’s amor mundi. Through a post-modern, interpretive and critical approach, this paper presentation aims to show that Arendt’s disapproval of the entrance of emotions in the public sphere is well-rooted in her phenomenological essentialism which does not include a look at non-Western societies where emotional connectivity sets the tone for everyday interaction among the inhabitants of those localities promoting amor mundi, or the love of the world.